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– Define Bid Protest & Desired Goals
– Discuss Costs & Benefits
• Model
– Introduce static, probabilistic, micro-economic, partial 
equilibrium, representative bidder model
– Discuss comparative statics results
• Policy Recommendations
– Is protest system an example of a well-intentioned 
government policy with negative unintended 
consequences?
– Explore alternatives to achieve Protest System Goals
Definition
• What is a Bid Protest?
“[A] written objection by an 
interested party [losing bidder] to: 
1. A solicitation…by an [government] agency for…a 
contract for…property or services, 
2. The cancellation of the solicitation…, 
3. An award or proposed award of 
the contract,
4. A termination or cancellation of an award of the 
contract…” 
– FAR Subpart 33.101 (Also see United States Code, 31 § 3551(1)) 
Claimed Benefits of Protest System 
expressed in Legal Literature: 
1. Bid Protests Deter Fraud & Errors:
– “Without the constraints of bid protests, government 
contracts will be let based on favoritism…and bribery—
as they were before the system was initiated.”
2. Bid Protests Promote Competition:
– “If those affected by the breach of rules cannot protest
in a meaningful way…competition is stifled.” 
K. Weckstein & M. Love “Bid Protest System Under Review,” 
Legal Times, June 12, 1995 (S29, S30 Special Report)
But Protests are Costly
(Hidden Transaction Costs &                     
Performance Penalties for Troops & Taxpayers)
• “[P]rotests are extremely detrimental to the 
warfighter & taxpayer.
– [P]rotest actions consume vast amounts of time 
of acquisition, legal, and requirements team 
members; 
– [and] delay program initiation, and the delivery 
of capability…”
» Quoted in M. Schwartz & K. Manuel, “GAO Bid Protests: Trends, Analysis, 
and Options,” Congressional Research Service, Feb. 2, 2009 p.8
John Young (Former Acting USD AT&L):
Goal of Study
Examine Costs & Benefits of Bid Protests 
through Economics Lens:
1. Claimed Benefits: 
 Improved procurement process:
i. Minimizes Favoritism, Fraud & Errors
ii. Promotes Competition 
2. Costs: 
 Higher transaction costs contribute to 
schedule delays, performance gaps & 
cost overruns
Do Protests Minimize Favoritism, Fraud & Errors?
 “Strategic bargaining”: Evidence suggests companies can 
use Protests as a negotiating tool, which may inadvertently 
introduce Favoritism, Fraud & Errors. Examples include:
• “Fed Mail”: When Bidders/Vendors use credible threat of 
delays from a protest to shape solicitation & influence award.
• “Buy Offs”: When Acquisition officials shape solicitation 
& influence awards in fear of credible threats of a protest.
 Ex-Ante: Hidden costs to deter protests
 Ex-Post: Hidden costs to make them go away
–Two Examples of Buy Offs: 
» Split Buys (Coughlan, P. & W. Gates, Endogenous Split Buys as a Bid 
Protest Management Tool, Acquisition Research Report, Naval 
Postgraduate School, NPS-CM-12-180, July 18, 2012).
» Quid pro Quo “Lockheed Martin is…offered…block buy for F-35 
aircraft, in exchange for not objecting to rival Boeing getting new 
orders from the Navy for the F/A-18 fighter…” (Reuters, 2016)
First Policy Recommendation: 
Revisit GAO’s Protest “Effectiveness Rate” Metric
• GAO’s Protest “Effectiveness Rate” Metric:
• “[P]ercentage of protesters obtaining relief—either 
through a protest being sustained, or through voluntary 
action taken by [an] agency.”
– CRS (2009) claims Effectiveness Rate is: 
• “[A] good way to measure the number of protests that 
have actual or potential merit.”
• Note: GAO’s “Effectiveness Rate” is NOT a good 
way to measure protests that have actual or potential 
merit, if “voluntary action” taken by an agency 
consists of “Fed-Mail” or “Buy-Off” settlements.
Do Protests Minimize Fraud & Errors?
 Not necessarily if there is:
1) “Strategic bargaining” (Fed Mail & Buy Offs)
2) “Fishing expeditions” (Asymmetric info.)
• Bidders use protests to obtain data on 
competitors, to gain advantages in 
current and future competitions. 
3) “Side agreements” (Collusion)
• Bidders make side deals with each 
other not to protest in exchange for ?
Do Protests Promote Competition?
• Legal literature focuses on “losing bidders”
– Losing bidder types offered a chance to protest may be 
more likely to compete (i.e. possible “second bite at the 
apple” increases expected value/return from competing) 
• Legal literature ignores “winning bidders”! 
– Winning bidder types that face extra costs of defending 
award are less likely to compete (i.e. extra transaction 
costs to defend winning bid lowers expected returns).
• Result: Net effect on competition is an 
empirical question! (limiting protest could increase competition!)
• Legal literature also ignores Transaction Cost Economics: 
– i.e. Ex-ante Competition can lead to Ex-post Monopoly
Second Policy Recommendation
• To promote competition, “contestable markets” literature 
suggests lowering entry barriers is more cost-effective. 
(Baumol, Panzar, & Willig, 1982, etc.)
• For example, reducing:
– Bidding costs/barriers
• Military specs & product complexity
• Government-specific accounting/reporting
& other requirements (regulatory complexity) ;
• The degree of asset specificity; and
– Incumbents’ ability to restrict competition
through strategic protests.
Dan Gordon (Former Head of the Office of 
Federal Procurement Policy) observed: 
• “It is…true that very high-dollar procurements are 
much more likely to be protested: 
• the higher the dollar value, the greater the 
likelihood of a protest…
• For a company that loses the competition… with 
all the bid and proposal  costs [“bidding costs”]…, 
additional costs of filing a protest [“filing fees”] 
may seem minimal, 
• so that filing a protest can be very tempting.” 
» Quoted in C. Clark (3/12/2013) 
Model Assumptions:
There are no “frivolous” protests, only 
“strategic” protests. 
Protests are an integral part of a 
bidder’s profit maximization decision.
• Representative Bidder’s Objective:
– Select a Bid Price (P), and Protest 
Investment (I), to Maximize Expected 
Profits. 
– Three possible profit streams…
Representative Bidder 
























X0=Award=[PxQ(Io)-C(Q(Io,R))]; X1=Protest Prize; X3=“Booby Prize” or Loser Pays  
Probability of Winning: Pw=Pw(P,N,CB)
Probability Protest Sustained: Ps= Ps(P,I,N,T,I0,R, CB)
CB=Bidding Costs (proxy for quality); N=# of Bidders; I0=Sum Protests by Other 
Bidders; CF=Protest Filing Fees; R=Regulatory Complexity; T=Official Training 
Comparative Statics Results
Max V(P,I)=E(W)+E(W/L)+E(L/L)
(Note: Prob(Win)+Prob(Win/Lose)+Prob(Lose/Lose) = Pw+(1-Pw)Ps+(1-Pw)(1-Ps) = 1)
X1 X2 X3>0 
(X3<0)
N Io CB CF T (R)
P* +? + + (-) -? -? + - - (+)
I* + - - (+) - - + 0 - (+)
V* + + + (-) ? - ? - - (?)
N=# of Bidders; I0=Protest Investments by Other Bidders; 
CB=Bidding Costs (proxy for quality); CF=Filing Fees
T=Official Training; R=Regulatory Complexity; 
• Representative Bidder Controls: Bid Price (P*) & Protest Investment (I*).
• Govt Controls: Protest Win Prize (X1), Protest Lose Prize/Penalty (X3), CF, T & R.
Alternative approaches to accomplish dual goals of a protest system:
• Reduce unnecessary regulatory burdens (R); “loser pays” (X3<0); narrow standing
(eligibility); set stricter time limits for filing (and deciding) protests; encourage ADR.
• Invest in human capital (T):
i. invest in education, training & experience (NPS/GSBPP/Acquisition Program)
ii. Reduce procurement complexity and increase transparency of assessment,
evaluation & selection process
iii. link pay & promotion to successful procurement outcomes
• Reduce protest prize (X1):
i. Reduce procurement prize (Xo) (unbundle contract vertically—stages of
production, or horizontally—quantities e.g. share award—split buys); or
ii. Use protest data/reputation in future competitions (i.e., for contract
quantities, etc.)
– Raise filing fees (CF), & awareness low probability of awards being overturned
– Introduce random IG procurement audits; etc.
Observation: 
• The private sector does not use bid protests to 
reduce fraud & errors, or encourage competition!
• Companies use other mechanisms: 
–Reputation
– Internal & External (shareholder) audits, and
–Align incentives of procurement personnel with 
those of the company through:
» Professional training, 
»Performance-based bonuses,
»Promotion decisions, etc. 
Final Observations
• Major concern of legal & regulatory literature is 
limiting protests will inhibit competition, and result 
in higher costs. (See Kepplinger, 2009, p. 12)
• However, literature is often silent about strategic 
behavior of bidders & procurement officials. 
• Also ignores “winning bidder types” deterred 
because of higher transaction costs.
• Largely silent about benefits of more timely 
delivery of projects, products & services, lower 
transaction costs, and potentially lower prices, from 
fewer protests. 
Policy Recommendations
1) Revisit GAO’s Protest “Effectiveness Rate” Metric                   
2) Promote Competition by Lowering Entry Barriers
– Reduce bidding costs & other barriers to entry:
– Military specs & product complexity
– Government-specific accounting/reporting
& other requirements (regulatory complexity) ;
– The degree of asset specificity;
and:
• Reduce ability to limit competition through
strategic bid protests.
CONCLUSION
• Challenge is to apply economic lens of cost-
benefit analysis to help select optimum mix 
(or portfolio) of governance mechanisms 
that minimize costs of aligning incentives to:
– Reduce the risk of favoritism, fraud and errors, 
– Encourage competition, and 
–Guarantee the best possible procurement 
outcomes for Troops and Taxpayers.
• This study is intended as a first step.
